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Abstract 
Although the Internet is great for transferring 
information, transactions in Internet auctions have a 
greater information asymmetry than corresponding 
transactions in traditional environments because current 
auction market mechanisms allow the seller to remain 
anonymous and to easily change identities.  Buyers must 
rely on the seller's description of a product and ability to 
deliver the product as promised.  Internet auction 
environments make opportunistic behavior more 
attractive to sellers because the chance of detection and 
punishment is decreased.  In this research, we examine 
auction data to see the effect of opportunism in the online 
auction environment. 
Introduction 
E-commerce (EC) offers a variety of  new business 
models, such as long-lasting auctions or 24-hour per day 
automated order taking. These new models are designed 
to generate and sustain revenue by taking advantage of 
the unique characteristics of the World Wide Web. 
Though the trade media has viewed EC as "the next big 
thing," its growth has been below expectations. Most 
companies have Web sites to provide information, but 
only 4% of organizations currently generate revenue 
using EC technology, up from 3% in 1998 (Littlewood 
1999), implying low customer demand for EC services 
from most customers. Many media analysts attribute the 
lower-than-expected EC growth to low levels of trust 
among consumers (Rankin 1999). Many observers have 
written about how EC benefits the consumer because of 
reduced search costs (Bakos 1997; Choudhury 1998). 
However, what needs to be better recognized by the 
research literature is how EC opportunism is facilitated by 
an increase in information asymmetry between the online 
buyer and the online seller.   
Economics defines information asymmetries as 
instances in which there is knowledge that one party has 
and that another other party lacks in a variety of decision-
making settings (e.g., production, investment, resource 
allocation, contracting, and so on).  Information 
asymmetries often lead to various kinds of problems in 
these settings, including inappropriate decisions and 
outcomes, unfair exchanges of value, and loss of social 
welfare.  They also can occur in sales transactions, where 
buyers and sellers are involved. The asymmetry in 
information can occur with respect to knowledge about 
product quality or knowledge about behavior that may 
occur even after the sale. As a result, information 
asymmetries can lead to transactions in which only one 
side benefits.  They can also lead to fraud, cheating,  
 
misrepresentation of self or product, or other moral 
hazards benefiting one party in a transaction at the 
expense of another (Tirole 1988). 
Although EC buyer behavior has been investigated 
(Lee 1998), less work has been done to investigate 
changes in seller behavior, especially in Internet auctions. 
In this research, we propose and test a model that shows 
how sellers in Internet auctions behave in the absence of 
identification, personal contact, and a higher uncertainty 
on the part of the buyer about the product. We explore the 
following research questions: 
· Why and how does the increase in information 
asymmetry brought about by Internet auction 
transactions change seller behavior? 
· How does the buyer in an Internet auction respond to 
this increase in information asymmetry? 
· How does information asymmetry affect prices in 
online auctions, and social welfare, more generally? 
We employ a software agent to gather data from 
online auctions, extending prior work by Kauffman, 
March, and Wood (1999). We analyze this data to show 
how Internet auction sellers react to the customer when 
information asymmetry increases.  
Literature  
We examined two areas in the literature that offer 
useful insights for modeling and understanding 
information asymmetry problems in buyer-seller 
interaction on the World Wide Web.  The economics 
literature has a stream of research that investigates 
problems involving information asymmetries. This work 
analyzes the effects of one-sided information in a 
transaction. In addition, there are a number of recent 
articles in the information systems literature that discuss 
online auctions, as well as a larger body of literature on 
the economics of auctions that are worthwhile in this 
context.  See Milgrom (1989) for an overview. 
Economic Perspectives on Information 
Asymmetries. Many authors have investigated how 
information asymmetries can lead to a reduction of 
promised product quality. Akerloff (1970) discussed how 
markets with high information asymmetry such as the 
used car market eliminate potential transactions because 
buyers cannot believe sellers will not act 
opportunistically.  As a result, buyers will not pay for any 
quality car above the lowest quality. Hence, high quality 
sellers will not be able to sell their products for what they 
are worth, and therefore will not transact.  Klein and 
Leffler (1981) developed an analytical model that shows 
how opportunistic behavior will occur when the profit 
from misleading customers is greater than the profit from 
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lost sales due to reputation effects.  Shapiro (1982) 
discussed how, when sellers control a market (as with a 
monopoly), product quality is reduced if buyers cannot be 
fully and accurately evaluated before the purchase.  In 
related work, Shapiro (1983) extended Klein and Leffler's 
model and relaxed their assumption of perfect 
communication between customers. We apply Shapiro's 
model as a theoretical basis for the ideas presented in this 
paper.  
IS Perspectives on Online Auctions. Although the 
current body of online auction literature has ignored seller 
behavior in online auctions, there have been many recent 
studies examining item characteristics and bidder 
behavior in Internet auctions. Bapna, Goes and Gupta 
(2000a) discuss how bid increment can affect revenue 
generated in a multi-item auction.  They also discuss lot 
size, opening bid amount, the magnitude of closing bids 
and the specified bid increment all affect the revenue 
generated by an Internet multi-item auction.  A related 
paper (Bapna, Goes and Gupta, 2000b) uses online 
auction data to explore and refute some common 
assumptions about online auction behavior found in the 
economics literature (e.g., Milgrom, 1989).  Both of these 
papers delve into types of bidders found on multi-item 
auctions. We extend their results in this research by 
comparing seller behavior to bidder behavior, and by 
investigating bidder response to seller behavior. 
Seidmann and Vakrat (1999) compared online 
catalog prices with online auction prices.   They obtained 
data from 473 online auctions, such as SurplusAuction 
(www.surplusauction.com) and OnSale.Com 
(www.onsale.com).  They compared prices received in 
these auctions with prices from Internet catalog sellers, 
such as Egghead (www.egghead.com) and 
PriceScan.Com (www.pricescan.com). Their data analysis 
revealed that consumers expect greater discounts for more 
expensive items. A second study by Vakrat and Seidmann 
(2000) analyzed bidder arrivals in 324 online auctions and 
found that about 70% of bidders arrive during the first 
half of the auction and that high required starting bids 
tends to result  in fewer bidders. In their studies, Seidmann 
and Vakrat employed Internet agents as a data collection 
tool. Although they compared online catalog prices to 
Internet auction prices, we will be comparing online 
auction prices to traditional, "real-world" shops. We 
extend their work to investigate why researchers can 
expect information asymmetries to cause a difference in 
prices between traditional and online sources. Also, 
although Vakrat and Seidmann concentrated on timing of 
bidder entry into an auction, we concentrate on timing of 
bidder exit from an auction. 
Modeling Opportunistic Behavior Among 
Sellers in Internet Auctions  
Our proposed model is based on a model by Shapiro 
(1983).  He defined, in general terms, how price premia 
from good reputations cause sellers to avoid selling low-
quality goods in markets where the buyer cannot inspect a 
good before buying. Shapiro's model shows that there is a 
price premium for acting reputably.  Moreover, buyers 
will penalize opportunistic players, and no longer pay a 
premium for their products. 
Although Shapiro concentrated only on a seller's 
misrepresentation of quality, we generalize his model to 
describe any opportunistic behavior.  Shapiro made two 
simplifying assumptions.  First, he assumed perfect 
competition where sellers can only sell for marginal cost.  
We relax that assumption to allow all sellers to profit, 
thereby showing the motivation for the sale for both 
opportunistic and non-opportunistic sellers.  Second, 
sellers were easily identified and distinguishable from 
each other. By this assumption, he assumed that sellers 
would be punished for acting opportunistically by 
experiencing reduced demand and lower profits.  
We assume that products are sold at price PR by 
perceived reputable sellers (R), resulting in a quantity 
sold of QR. Goods sold by non-reputable sellers (N) are 
sold at price PN with quantity QN.   We assume that the 
non-reputable sellers  are new sellers who are untested, 
and thus do not have a reputation yet.  They also may be 
inclined to profit from opportunistic behavior.  Rational 
buyers demand fewer goods from non-reputable sellers 
and will penalize their lack of reputation by paying less 
(PN) until their reputation can be established.  A reputable 
seller can demand a higher price for his products since 
buyers rely on his reputation. The economics literature 
shows that rational sellers will act opportunistically unless 
buyers not only pay more by absorbing the higher cost of 
production, but also reward non-reputable sellers with a 
price premium for acting non-opportunistically (Klein and 
Leffler 1981; Shapiro, 1983).   
Figure 1, based on the model presented by Shapiro 
(1983), shows how the price charged by an opportunistic 
seller in a purely competitive environment, PR, is the price 
that leads to normal profits plus the price premium that 
consumers are willing to pay that acts as an incentive to 
sellers to avoid opportunism. UG is the utility of not 
selling.  For some sellers in an Internet auction, UG will 
be the cost of production.1  For others, such as collectors 
on eBay, UG will be the utility the seller receives from 
keeping the product, if he is unable to sell at or above his 
reserve price. Once utility of selling the item (e.g., the 
revenue from the sale, US) exceeds UG, the seller will sell 
the item. Reputable sellers gain additional utility, UR, in 
the form of a price premium for acting reputably.  The 
utility that opportunistic sellers (O) receive, UO, is from 
the profit from the sale as well as the opportunistic action, 
but if detected, the seller would forego future sales. 
By changing behavior and acting opportunistically, 
an opportunistic seller will increase profit because the 
                                                                 
1 This is not an unreasonable assumption, because some crafts 
and collectibles are made for direct sale via the Internet in 
auctions such as eBay's, when seller-producers don't have the 
capability to sell in another channel. 
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seller not only profits from opportunistic behavior but 
also receives a price premium for being perceived as a 
reputable seller. In the first period, buyers will not know 
that the opportunistic seller acted opportunistically and 
would still be willing to pay more for products from this 
seller. Equation 1 shows that the Period 1 profits for 
acting opportunistically is a product of the number of 
units sold and the difference between revenue gained by 
the opportunistic action and the price premium of a 
reputable seller. 
Single-Period Profit for Opportunistic Seller: 
( )dqUU
QR
QN
ROò -=1p                                          (1) 
Assuming perfect detection and perfect customer-to-
customer communication, in periods that follow Period 1, 
the opportunistic seller will achieve lower sales; 
consumers will now consider the seller to be 
opportunistic, and will avoid buying from that seller. 
Shapiro (1983) went further to describe situations where 
the opportunism would not be detected.  For instance, in a 
new car, safety features (such as air bag equipment) can 
be left off, and the consumer might never find out. He 
introduced a variable, l, to indicate the probability of 
detection of opportunistic behavior.  For the purposes of 
our model, we expand Shapiro's definition by defining l 
as the probability of being detected and punished for 
opportunistic behavior. Opportunistic sellers do not 
consider whether they will be detected, but rather they 
concentrate on the probability of future losses because of 
their current behavior.  Future losses can be expressed as 
1-l adjusted by the annuity discount rate, r, multiplied by 
future profits for non-opportunistic behavior, as shown in 
Equation 2.  
Future Lost Profit for Current Opportunistic Seller: 
( )dqUU
r
QR
QN
GRf ò -
-
=
lp 1                               (2) 
When pf ³  p1, the reputable seller will not act 
opportunistically.  This is because it will not be in his best 
interest to do so.  Only if pf < p1 will the seller act 
opportunistically.   In Equation 2, the lower the 
probability of detection and punishment, the greater the 
likelihood of an opportunistic seller emerging in the 
market.  Therefore, not only does there need to be a 
reasonable profit for not acting opportunistically, but 
there also needs to be a reasonable chance of punishment 
if a seller starts acting opportunistically.  This is shown in 
the conceptual framework in Figure 2. As the chance of 
detection and punishment approaches zero, buyers will 
assume that opportunistic behavior will occur no matter 
what, and will force prices down across the entire market 
as a result (Akerloff 1970). More generally, we believe 
that increases in information asymmetry in a variety of 
buyer-seller interaction settings on the Internet (even with 
straightforward marketing and selling websites, for 
example) can make opportunistic behavior more attractive 
to online sellers.  Their chances of being punished are 
slight, since anonymity is so easy to obtain on the 
Internet. 
Figure 2 -- Incentives for Opportunistic Behavior 
Expected Profits from 
Premiums for 
 Non-Opportunistic 
Future Transactions 
Probability of 
Detection and 
Punishment of 
Opportunism 
Profit from 
Opportunistic 
Behavior 
Opportunistic 
Behavior 
- 
+ 
 
Analysis 
Testing seller opportunism is difficult for three 
reasons. First, non-reputable sellers try to remain 
anonymous. Because they are attempting to hide their 
identity, it is difficult to identify them. Second, it is 
difficult to track multiple Internet auction identities and 
tie them together. Third , opportunistic behavior often 
needs to be viewed in total rather than in isolation.  For 
instance, if a seller leaves himself a good comment or 
bids on his own item to run the price up, such behavior 
needs to be viewed in context of other behavior before the 
opportunistic seller can be identified. 
Based on the proposed model, we expect sellers in 
Internet auctions to be likely to be opportunistic. From 
anecdotal evidence in discussions with eBay buyers, we 
know that sellers can easily set up multiple identities and 
sell through the same channel.  Sellers are also 
anonymous.  Finally, sellers can easily perform 
opportunistic behavior that is difficult to detect.  Sellers 
either establish new handles or work in collusion with 
certain buyers to bid on their own items and also may 
leave themselves good reputation scores. As a result of 
the reduction in the chances of detection, the Internet 
auction seller's benefit from opportunistic behavior may 
Figure 1 --  Profit Based on Reputation 
P 
Q 
PN 
QN  
U S 
UR  = US + Price Premium   
UG 
Profit from sellers 
with no reputation 
Profit from sellers 
with reputation 
PR 
QR  
UO = U S  + Price Premium  
+ Opportunistic Profit  
Profit from sellers who 
act opportunistically 
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be greater than the chance of loss of profit from future 
transactions since changing a handle can mask a seller's 
identity and eliminate reputation effects. 
Rational buyers in Internet auctions recognize that 
sellers have several avenues of opportunistic behavior 
open to them. As a result, we hypothesize that rational 
bidders pay little, if any, attention to a seller reputation 
score reported by the auction because of possible 
opportunistic action by the seller to leave themselves 
good comments.  In addition, online auctions should 
command lower prices than identical items sold in 
traditional markets where the information asymmetry is 
less prominent.  This is because, as Akerloff (1970) 
suggests, the high chance of opportunism decreases the 
amount sellers can charge.  Buyers will expect some level 
of opportunism because of the increase in information 
asymmetry and will adjust their prices downward. 
Data and Hypotheses. Using the methodologies 
described by Kauffman, March, and Wood (1999), we 
developed a data-collecting Internet agent to gather data 
from an online auction. With the information gathered by 
this agent, we explored bid timing and amounts, and 
gauged the effects of an auction and item characteristics 
on what a bidder is willing to bid. The exhaustive nature 
of this data collection would have been impossible using 
traditional data-collection methodologies.   
Our focus in this study is the rare coin collection 
market on eBay.  We classified coins using an artificial 
intellegence algorithm that we developed for this purpose.  
The algorithm uses a classification scheme that consists of 
identifying the coin year (e.g., 1888, etc.), the coin 
denomination (e.g., penny, 2-cent piece, etc.), the coin 
type (e.g., Philadelphia mint, double die, feather between 
the "C" and the "A", etc.), and the condition, or coin 
grade (e.g., very good, extremely fine, etc.). Coin grade is 
communicated using a special language known to coin 
collectors.  It allows coin collectors to communicate the 
grade of a coin.  For example, collectors know the 
difference between fine and very fine, and that  fine+ and 
fine/very fine and f15 are the same grade for a coin.  Only 
rare coins from the 1800s were considered, to eliminate 
the likelihood that "flea market" buyers and sellers would 
be considered. Coin types and book values for these coins 
were obtained from Coin World (Gibbs 1999), the 
"industry bible" for coin collectors. These book values are 
typically what is charged by coin dealers at coin stores, 
like the Blue Book  of used car prices, and represent 
pricing in the traditional market for coin collectors.  We 
collected 38,714 bids from 6,798 different bidders on 
14,528 items from eBay during May 1999 and February 
2000.  Any bid that came in later than a previous bid but 
was for a lesser amount was not placed in the data set.  
We define questionable bidder behavior (QBB) as 
bidding on an item when the same or a lower bid could 
have been made on the exact same item in a concurrent 
auction ending before the bid-upon auction. We consider 
QBB to be irrational, since the buyer has a greater level of 
utility if she were to bid on another item for the same or 
lower cost. We feel it is reasonable to assume that eBay 
sellers have identical reputations, since they are typically 
small dealers who do not have much brand equity. Bakos 
(1997) showed that, for commodity items, rational buyers 
will buy the lowest priced item when the search price is 
low. There are three possible explanations for QBB. First, 
bidders are only boundedly rational and do not search the 
auction for similar items before bidding.  We reject this 
logic for two reasons: (a) auctions that end early appear 
towards the top in the eBay screen display and therefore 
should be found first, and (b) most auctions allow easy 
searching for items.  Second, bidders are irrational and 
bid on an item that is listed that gives other bidders 
greater time to bid against their bid. While irrational 
behavior may be exhibited by some bidders some of the 
time, we reject the idea that bidders in aggregate will bid 
on an item when the same or lower bid can be offered on 
an item whose sale is ending sooner. Third , bidders have a 
vested interest in making sure a high price is received for 
a particular item, either because of collusion with the 
seller or because the buyer handle is used by the seller as 
a second identity to run up the bid. We believe that this is 
the case.  We found QBB in 987 bids in 713 auctions.  
We next investigate three hypotheses using our data: 
Low Revenue Hypothesis: Online coin auctions 
will generate significantly lower prices than Coin 
World's book value, which is used to sell coins in 
traditional coin shops. Akerloff (1970) and Leland 
(1979) showed that, when faced with an asymmetric 
information situation, buyers will be forced to assume that 
the value of what they are buying is not worth what the 
seller is stating.  This is because the seller may act 
opportunistically and mislead the buyer about the 
condition of the good.   Although Akerloff concentrated 
on the used car market, the same dynamics should also 
apply to online auctions where the buyer cannot inspect 
the good before the transaction.  We hypothesize that 
goods purchased in an EC environment must sell for less 
than corresponding goods sold from a traditional store.  
Of the 10,000 coins listed, 8,011were sold to bidders and 
had an entry in Coin World (Gibbs 1999).  Our findings 
support the hypothesis with a high level of significance.  
Coins transacted in online auctions sold at only 47% of 
the price suggested by Coin World. These results confirm 
Akerloff's (1970) and Leland's (1979) research: buyers 
expect to pay less for coins sold in online auctions 
because of the increased risk of opportunism. 
Effective Comments Hypothesis: eBay's reputation 
score will have an insignificant impact on seller price 
and bids, and negative comments will have a significant, 
negative effect on seller price.  Akerloff (1970) describes 
how buyers, when faced with asymmetric information, 
will act rationally and will assume that sellers will take 
advantage of the information asymmetry to act 
opportunistically.  Based on conversations that we had 
with eBay bidders and our personal experiences, we 
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learned that some sellers may offer a discount after the 
auction if the buyer leaves a good comment.  
Additionally, we found that some sellers can leave 
themselves good comments using another handle or work 
in conjunction with other sellers to leave each other good 
comments. Hence, we believe that rational bidders will 
realize the ineffectiveness of comments and ignore the 
eBay reputation score when making buying decisions. 
Conversely, since buyers can leave bad comments for 
sellers but sellers would have no incentive to leave 
themselves bad comments, we hypothesized that negative 
comments will have a significant, negative effect on price. 
For this test, we conducted a within-subjects quasi-
experiment.  Since collectibles can change in value over 
time, we first separated bids collected in March 1999 
from bids collected in February 2000. We then identified 
buyers who bid multiple times on the same item (same 
year, denomination, type, grade) from different sellers 
during the same time period, and calculated the average 
price for each bidder. We identified 774 distinct 
bidders/item combinations.  From these, we identified 
1,822 final bids from bidders for items and calculated the 
percentage difference between the final bid for each 
specific item and seller and the average for that item 
among all sellers. We then compared the percentage to 
eBay's reported reputation overall score and to the 
number of negative comments left by other bidders.  Our 
analysis showed an extremely slight correlation (r =4%) 
between reputation score and price that was only 
modestly significant (p-value=.076).  We expected a 
significant negative relationship between the number of 
negative comments and price. Instead, we found a 
positive (r =1.1%) but insignificant (p-value = .63) 
correlation between negative comments and price.  When 
the percentage of negative comments to overall comments 
is considered instead of the raw negative score, we see the 
predictive negative effect (r =-3.0%), but not at a 
significant level (p-value = .20). Finally, the relationship 
between number of bids and the reputation is significantly 
negative (r =-0.1 with a p-value extremely close to zero). 
We explain these results by noting that higher 
overall reputation scores and many negative comments 
indicate a seller who has sold much on eBay and is 
somewhat established.  Therefore, buyers may feel safer 
with more established players than with the fly-by-night 
sellers who do not stand to gain much from a good 
reputation.  Non-established bidders tend to set starting 
bids that are too low, and therefore invite a larger number 
of bidders. In other words, eBay’s reputation score can be 
a proxy for seller experience rather than the actual 
reputation of the seller. 
Run Up the Bid Hypothesis: Bidders that exhibit 
QBB will bid on items from fewer sellers, have a lesser 
probability of winning an auction than average, tend to 
complete bidding earlier in an auction compared to 
other bidders, and, bid in higher increments than 
average increments between bids.  Detecting multiple 
handles in online auctions is especially difficult. Sellers 
who run up the bid will try to remain anonymous, and the 
online auction environment facilitates their anonymity. 
Since it is unlikely to find bidders who will divulge their 
opportunistic actions, instead we investigated recorded 
behavior that is intrinsic to running up the bid.  Specific-
ally, those who run up the bid: 
(a) are agents of the seller, and therefore not necessarily 
buyers and will tend to limit their bids to a single 
seller or perhaps a few seller Ids;  
(b) do not want to win the auction, but rather want the 
winner to pay more;  
(c) want to avoid bidding near the end of the auction 
where the chance of winning is greater; and, 
(d) bid in increments higher than average in an effort to 
quickly run up the bid.   
Table 1. Results of Hypothesis Tests 
Hypothesis t-
statistic 
N  
(Group1/ 
Group 2) 
Low Revenue: 
Auction Price for Coins 
Will Be Less Than Coin 
Store Price 
13.2*** 8,011 / 
 8,011 
Effective Comments:  
(a) Overall Score Will 
Be Significant on 
Final Price 
1.8* 1,822 /   
1,822 
(b) Negative Comments 
Will Be Negative 
and Significant on 
Final Price 
0.5 1,822 /   
1,822 
(c) Percentage Ratio of 
Negative Comments 
to Overall Score 
Will Be Negative 
and Significant on 
Final Price 
-1.3 1820 
(d) Overall Score Will 
Be Significant and 
Positive on the 
Number of bids 
-11.2*** 14,156 
Run Up the Bid: QBs who we hypothesize are in 
actuality running up the bid have: 
 (a) Fewer Sellers 3.8*** 643 /   
6,155 
 (b) Fewer Winners 7.5*** 1,260 / 
26,425 
 (c) More Early Bidders 39.3*** 1,260 / 
26,425 
 (d) Higher Bid 
Increments 
3.9*** 588 / 
18,648 
Legend: * = significant at the 10% level; 
*** = significant at the 1% level 
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We examine these by studying the behavior of those 
bidders who exhibited QBB. We then compare their 
behavior to other bidders' behavior to see if there is 
evidence of collusion or multiple seller handles used to 
run up the bid.We identified 643 bidders from the 6,798 
different bidders that have shown QBB. To test the 
number of sellers, we derived a ratio between the number 
bids and the number of sellers.  A non-parametric two-
tailed t-test was used to test the ratios to see if there was a 
difference. "Questionable bidders" (QBs) had more bids 
per seller than other bidders (m =1.45 vs. m =1.25), 
indicating that QBs are concentrating on specific sellers.  
Our analysis shows that QBs only win 26% of the time, 
compared to bids from other bidders who win 35% of the 
time.  QBs also tend to drop out sooner than other 
bidders.  They drop out an average of  5.1 days before the 
auction ends, compared with 1.8 days before the auction 
ends for other bidders.  Finally, QBs tend to bid 200% 
above the previous bid, if there is one.  Other bidders, on 
the other hand, only bid 65% above the previous bid.  
These tests show that results consistent with "running up 
the bid" behavior exist in online auctions, and that sellers 
are running up the bid to try to falsely signal more interest 
in an item or to get the current bidders to bid higher 
amounts. 
Contribution 
This is one of the first examinations of Internet 
auction seller behavior. Opportunistic seller behavior is 
extremely difficult to research because of the guile 
exhibited by opportunistic sellers. We addressed this by 
determining what the end result of opportunistic behavior 
would be, how that would be different if there were no 
opportunistic behavior, and then tested to see if there is 
evidence of the results of opportunistic behavior. With the 
rate of EC consumer fraud increasing at record levels, 
especially in online auctions, such an examination is 
needed.  Armed with our results, online auction bidders 
can be better prepared for an online environment where 
information asymmetry gives sellers an advantage. 
Buyers' reaction to the increase in opportunism was 
also examined in this research.  Buyers will not pay as 
much as they do in traditional markets, and we feel buyers 
tend to ignore the reputation score in eBay, but base their 
evaluation of reputation on their own observations of 
which sellers are interested in long-term relationships 
with the eBay channel.   
One possible limitation of this study is the existence 
of automatic bidding technologies.  Embedded in some 
auction Web sites, these technologies automatically lodge 
bids for a bidder by the exact bid increment over the 
current bid.  We reject that QBB is a result of automatic 
bidding because of the differences in the other tests.  
While Automatic Bidders will have earlier bids because 
the technology allows them to enter an auction early, they 
also will have lower not higher bid increments, as shown 
by our tests.  Furthermore, there is no reason to assume 
that automatic bidders will bid on fewer sellers or 
generate fewer winners. 
Another possible limitation of this analysis is the 
documented existence of evaluators by Bapna, Goes, and 
Gupta (2000a; 2000b). They showed how evaluators in 
multi-item auctions bid early at an amount higher than the 
bid increment.  We reject that QBs are evaluators because 
of three reasons. First, the authors indicated that 
evaluators would be rare in traditional auctions like eBay.  
Second, the authors also never indicated that QBs could 
have bid on other items in auctions that ended earlier.  
Third , evaluators in their work usually won their auctions 
compared with QBs who typically lost their auctions, 
indicating a difference in motivation between evaluators 
and QBs. 
Researchers will be able to build on the exploratory 
results that we report here. The framework presented in 
this paper is based on a relatively simple model that needs 
to be expanded to show why an equilibrium price 
premium for reputable sellers should exist that will deter 
opportunistic behavior. Additionally, researchers need to 
further delve into seller behavior both inside auctions and 
in EC in general to generate a more complete picture of 
seller strategies and behavior. 
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